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Size theory and the demand for voluntary audit 
by small companies in the UK  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of size as a proxy for qualitative factors 
that have a significant influence on whether small companies will have a voluntary audit. It 
builds on previous work by the author (Collis, 2003b; Collis, Jarvis and Skerratt, 2004) that 
has investigated the benefits of voluntary audit in small companies filing full accounts in the 
UK. The study is a further analysis of data from a random sample of 790 companies with a 
turnover up to £4.8m, balance sheet total up to £2.4m and up to 50 employees, collected via a 
postal questionnaire (Collis, 2003b). These were the maximum EU thresholds proposed for 
adoption in the UK at the time of the survey. 
 
The earlier research found that 42% of the sample companies would have a voluntary audit if 
eligible for exemption and identified turnover and specific qualitative factors as important 
predictors of demand. This study provides evidence that turnover is a proxy for cost in 
predicting whether the benefits of voluntary audit outweigh the cost. The significant 
management benefits are the director’s belief that audit improves the quality of the 
information and has a positive effect on the company’s credit rating score. In addition, there 
is evidence of agency benefits to companies that are not wholly family-owned. 
 
When both turnover and the cost of the audit are included separately with the specific 
qualitative variables in the regression model, both are significant. However, when they are 
entered together, neither is significant. This provides evidence to suggest that there is no 
predictive value in turnover that is not represented in cost. Therefore, the use of turnover in 
company law is providing a proxy for the relative cost burden. Since there is no theory of size 
in financial reporting regulation of small companies, this paper contributes by offering a 
framework based on empirical evidence.  
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1. Introduction 
 
For many years in the UK, all companies, apart from dormant companies, were required to 
have an independent audit.  This external examination or, and expression of opinion on the 
statutory accounts demonstrates ‘the completeness, accuracy and validity of transactions 
which, when aggregated, make up the financial statements’ (Power, 1997, p. 24).  However, 
in 1994 the Fourth Directive introduced changes that allowed EU member states to exempt 
small companies from the statutory audit.  In the UK, the government set the qualifying 
thresholds below the EU maxima, but revised them upwards several times until, in 2003, they 
matched the EU ceilings.  Throughout the nine-year period, there was considerable 
controversy over the appropriateness of the thresholds and this question is a key part of the 
wider ‘big GAAP/little GAAP’ debate on the need for different sets of generally accepted 
accounting principles for large and small entities.  Until recently, these debates have been 
dominated by anecdotal evidence from policy-makers and the accountancy profession, and 
the views of company directors have been largely ignored.  This is an important omission as 
the directors are the main users of the statutory accounts (Page, 1984; Carsberg, Page, Sindall 
and Waring, 1985; Barker and Noonan, 1996), which are used for a range of internal and 
external purposes (Collis and Jarvis, 2000 and 2002; Collis 2003a).  Their views are vital as 
they must weigh up the costs and benefits of an independent audit. 
   
The present study contributes to our knowledge of directors’ decisions regarding the audit.  It 
provides a further analysis of data from a survey of small companies (Collis, 2003b) that was 
commissioned by the DTI during consultations over proposals to raise the exemption level to 
the EU maxima.
1
  The paper investigates the role of size as a proxy for qualitative factors that 
have a significant influence on whether companies will have a voluntary audit and builds on 
the theoretical framework developed by Collis (2003b) and Collis, Jarvis and Skerratt (2004). 
 
Section 2 of this paper reviews the development of differential audit requirements and the 
literature that provides the theoretical framework for the study.  Section 3 describes the 
methodology, which paves the way for an examination and discussion of the results in 
Section 4.  The final section draws conclusions about the implications of the findings. 
 
2. Background to the study 
 
2.1 Development of differential audit requirements 
 
Differential financial reporting in terms of size developed in the UK in the early 1980s, when 
the burgeoning number of smaller entities in the economy led to small companies
2
 being 
offered a regulatory framework with some simplifications and concessions (little GAAP).  In 
1994 the EC Fourth Company Law Directive permitted national governments to dispense 
with the requirement for smaller entities to undergo an audit.  In the UK, this led to an 
amendment of section 249A of the Companies Act 1985 (SI 1994/1935) to exempt a 
company that had a turnover up to £90,000 (lower than the EU maximum), balance sheet 
total up to £1.4m and up to 50 employees, unless a full audit was required by shareholders 
holding at least 10% of share capital.  A company with a turnover of between £90,000 and 
                                               
1 Therefore, the commissioning of the study supported the government’s stance on evidence-based 
policymaking (Cabinet Office, 1999). 
2 Most of the requirements of company law also apply to limited liability partnerships, a new form of business 
vehicle permitted since April 2001. 
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£350,000 had to have an accountant’s report.  This was dropped in 1997 when the turnover 
threshold was raised to £350,000 (SI 1997/936) and companies were also required to qualify 
as ‘small’ for the purpose of filing abbreviated accounts.3  Under sections 247 and 247A of 
the Companies Act 1985, apart from certain companies that are excluded for reasons of 
public interest, a company qualifies as ‘small’ if it meets any two of three basic size tests 
shown in Table 1.  Apart from a newly incorporated company, the conditions must have been 
satisfied in two of the last three years (similar conditions apply to small groups). 
 
In 2000 the turnover threshold was increased to £1m (SI 2000/1430) with proposals to raise 
levels for all financial reporting purposes to the substantially higher EU maxima (DTI, 2000).  
At the time of the study in March 2003 these were: turnover £4.8m; balance sheet total 
£2.4m; employees 50.    However, in May the EU thresholds were adjusted for indexation 
purposes to turnover £5.6m and balance sheet total £2.8m and these thresholds were adopted 
in UK law with effect from January 2004 (SI 2004/16).  This process of step change towards 
European harmonisation is summarised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Audit exemption thresholds in the UK 1994 - 2004 
 
Criteria 1994 1997 2000 Pre-May 2003 
Proposal 
2004 
Turnover £0.09m £0.35m £1m £4.8m £5.6m 
Balance sheet total £1.4m £1.4m £1.4m £2.4m £2.8m 
Average employees 50 50 50 50 50 
 
2.2 Size as a proxy for cost and benefits 
 
The government’s rationale for audit exemption is that it relieves unnecessary cost burdens 
that fall disproportionately on small companies (DTI, 1995; DTI, 1999).  Implicit in this 
argument is the notion that below a certain size, the costs outweigh the benefits and vice 
versa.  The profession’s views on the most appropriate level for audit exemption are diverse.  
A survey conducted by the Small Practitioners Association found that ‘92% of accountants 
… supported exemption for all private, owner-managed, small limited companies’ (Mitchell, 
1999, p. 21).  The ICAEW was reported as describing the news that the thresholds could be 
raised to the EU maxima as ‘a positive step to ease the burdens on business’ (Accountancy, 
2003, p. 9), but others in the ICAEW argued that would reduce the quality of the information 
put on public record (Jones, 2003).  The ACCA was against lifting the limits, arguing that it 
would ‘take away the value-added aspect which comes with the audit’ (Beckerlegge, 1999, 
p.21) and raise the risk of fraud (Rose, 2003). 
 
The number of companies taking up exemption in the early years has not been published, but 
statistics for 2002/3 show that 676,300 companies (representing 57% of companies on the 
register) had filed either full or abbreviated accounts that were audit exempt (DTI, 2003, p. 
58).  The government anticipates that raising thresholds from the 2000 levels to the 2004 
levels would add a further 69,000 companies to the existing 822,000 companies classified as 
                                               
3 The options set out in Section 246 of the Companies Act (as revised by SI 1997/220) allow small and medium-
sized companies to prepare and file either full or abbreviated financial statements with the Registrar, but they 
must provide full financial statements for their shareholders.  Abbreviated accounts must be accompanied by a 
special auditors’ report, unless the company is exempt from the requirement for an audit by virtue of sections 
249A(1) or (2) or 250 of the Companies Act 1985.  
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small (Eaglesham, 2003), although the proportion of small companies meeting the conditions 
for audit exemption is not known. 
 
Until recently, the lack of reliable and up-to-date information on the costs and the benefits of 
the audit has limited the debate to anecdotal evidence, a number of small studies and opinion 
polls.  Since the regulatory framework for financial reporting by small companies is currently 
country-specific and highly dynamic, it can be argued that the results of overseas studies and 
some of the older studies have little relevance.  Moreover, many of the UK studies have been 
based on too small a sample to permit generalisation (for example, Page, 1984; Freedman and 
Goodwin, 1993; Pratten, 1998; Lin-Seouw, 2001). 
 
A MORI survey of 176 companies (ACCA, 1998) forecast that approximately 40% of 
companies with a turnover between £350,000 and £1.5m were likely to opt for audit 
exemption if the threshold were raised to a speculative level of £1.5m.  However, in 1999, a 
survey of the directors of 385 companies
4
 filing full accounts and having a turnover up to 
£4.2m (the EU threshold at that time) found that 29% would forgo the audit if they had a 
choice, whilst 63% would have a voluntary audit (Collis and Jarvis, 2000, Collis, 2003a). A 
second survey of the directors of 790 companies filing full accounts and having a turnover up 
to £4.8m was conducted for the DTI (Collis, 2003b) found that 42% of those likely to be 
eligible at that time (ie those with a turnover up to £1m) had chosen a voluntary audit and the 
same proportion of those with a turnover up to £4.8m predicted they would have a voluntary 
audit if eligible in future. This suggests that for a significant proportion of companies filing 
full accounts, the benefits of having the accounts audited outweigh the costs. 
 
2.3 Management and agency factors 
 
Analysis of the 1999 survey data by Collis et al. (2004) provided empirical evidence of 
several factors that influence the demand for a voluntary audit:  ‘It was found that turnover 
alone could represent size, but that size was less important than the directors’ perceptions of 
the value of the audit in terms of improving the quality of information and providing a check 
on internal records.  Agency relationships with [non-family] owners and lenders were also 
found to be significant influences on the demand for the audit’ (Collis et al., 2004, p. 87). The 
research also found that the director’s educational profile was an influential factor. 
 
An independent check on internal controls reduces the chance of material error.  In small 
companies inherent risk (the likelihood of a material misstatement arising) and control risk 
(the likelihood of the accounting control detecting any material misstatement) may be high.  
Previous research shows that the main recipients of the statutory accounts of small companies 
are lenders, the Inland Revenue, managers, creditors and customers (Collis and Jarvis, 2000).  
This suggests that management may want the accounts audited to provide assurance to these 
internal and external users.  Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) suggests that the 
directors will be willing to bear the cost of the audit to support agency relationships with 
principals where there is information asymmetry.  In small companies, a principal is anyone 
who is distant from the actions of management and is unable to verify them, such as external 
shareholders, lenders and creditors; information asymmetry may also be present amongst 
internal shareholders if they lack the necessary skills to interpret financial information 
(Power, 1997).   
 
                                               
4 The study achieved a 17% response rate from 2,287 companies. 
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The survey for the DTI (Collis, 2003b) extended the findings of the 1999 survey (Collis et 
al., 2004). The educational profile of the directors and number of employees were not found 
to be significant factors but, in addition to turnover and balance sheet total, six qualitative 
factors were found to explain the demand for voluntary audit. Management factors relate to 
belief that the audit: 
 
 provides a check on accounting records and systems 
 improves in the quality of the financial information 
 has a positive effect on the company’s credit rating score. 
 
Agency factors relate to companies that: 
 
 are not wholly family-owned 
 have external shareholders who do not have access to internal financial information; 
 give their statutory accounts to the bank and other lenders. 
 
Beliefs about the beneficial effect of the audit on the company’s credit rating score and its 
role in supporting agency relationships with external shareholders represent two additional 
influences on the audit decision not identified in the previous research. 
 
2.4 Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of the present study is to build on previous research with a view to developing 
size theory in financial reporting by small companies in the UK. It is based on further 
analysis of the survey data collected for the DTI study (Collis, 2003) and addresses the 
following research question: 
 
What is the role of size, as measured by turnover, in the demand for voluntary 
audit by small private companies filing full accounts in the UK? 
 
There is no theory of size in small company financial reporting, apart from widespread 
acknowledgement that the cost burden is disproportionate for small companies. Of the three 
size measures used in companies law (turnover, balance sheet total and employees), it can be 
argued that the higher the turnover, the lower the relative cost of the audit. It might also be 
argued that the higher the turnover, the higher the complexity of business activities; therefore, 
the greater the likelihood that the audit will bring management benefits by reducing risk as 
well as the cost of credit. To some extent, it can be argued that turnover also captures whether 
the company is large enough for the audit to agency benefits from the assurance provided to 
non-family and/or external shareholders, and lenders. However, the benefit in respect of 
agency relationships might be better represented by balance sheet total, since the higher this 
measure, the larger the capital employed in the business in terms of equity capital and debt 
finance. In addition, it can be argued that the fixed asset element would represent collateral 
against borrowings.
5
 
 
The general logistic regression model is: 
 
                                               
5 Although some fixed assets are sector sensitive (for example, construction and manufacturing companies are 
more likely to have plant and machinery; manufacturing and trading companies are more likely to carry stock), 
ownership of land and buildings is not industry specific.  
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Voluntary audit decision = f (turnover, management factors, agency factors) 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Sample selection and data collection 
 
The analysis in this paper is based on a postal questionnaire survey of the directors of 
unlisted, private limited companies across all industries and regions in the UK (Collis, 2003).  
In March 2003, a list of private limited companies that had already filed their accounts for 
2002 was drawn from FAME
6
 across all industries and regions of Great Britain.  As a proxy 
for qualifying as small under the proposed thresholds at the time of the study, the sample was 
selected on the basis of the company meeting all three of the following criteria in the 2002 
accounts: 
 
 turnover not exceeding £4.8m 
 balance sheet total not exceeding £2.4m 
 up to 50 employees. 
 
This resulted in a list of 3,202 companies that represented the population of companies of this 
size that had already filed their accounts. Since companies filing abbreviated accounts do not 
disclose all three figures, the sample consisted solely of companies that had filed full 
accounts.  Dormant companies, subsidiaries, groups and holding companies were removed in 
order to retain only active, independent companies where financial reporting decisions would 
not be influenced by group policy.  The questionnaire (see extract in appendix) was 
developed and piloted by conducting three interviews with auditors with small company 
clients and five interviews with directors of small companies. The questionnaire was posted 
to a named director, together with an accompanying letter and prepaid envelope in April 2003 
with one reminder. At this stage a small number were eliminated as the company had ceased 
trading, moved away or the owner was absent/unable to participate.  This reduced the list to 
2,633 companies.  By the cut-off date of 28 May 2003, 790 usable replies had been received, 
giving a response rate of 30%. 
 
3.2 Response rate 
 
According to Krejcie and Morgan (1970, p. 608), the size of the sample (790) is sufficient to 
represent the population of 3,202 from which it was drawn, as it greatly exceeds the 
minimum acceptable sample size of 343. Tests for non-response bias found that non-
respondents were likely to have been smaller in terms of number of employees.  This 
indicates that the sample contained fewer companies with no employees or very few 
employees compared with the population.  However, in terms of turnover and balance sheet 
total, the results showed that the sample was representative of the body of companies from 
which it was drawn. 
 
3.3 Respondents and sample companies 
 
In 94% of cases the questionnaire was answered by the principal director, finance director or 
company secretary.  The position and the educational profiles of the respondents suggested 
                                               
6 A database that contains up to 10 years’ information on British companies registered at Companies House (one 
month after the accounts are filed), including more than 2.3m private companies of all sizes. 
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they would have both tacit and formal knowledge with which to answer the questions and 
weigh up the costs and benefits of the audit when making the audit decision. 
 
As in the wider population, the majority of the sample companies were at the smaller end of 
scale in terms of ownership and size.  The majority (90%) had 1 to 4 shareholders.  In terms 
of size, 80% had a maximum turnover of £1m in their 2002 accounts, 89% had a maximum 
balance sheet total of £1.4m, and 78% had 0 to 10 employees. 
 
In 74% of companies all shareholders had access to internal financial information, which 
implies that these companies were owner-managed, and 68% of the sample companies were 
wholly family-owned.  This suggests that there is potential for information asymmetry among 
shareholders in up to one-third of the sample companies. 
 
A large proportion of companies (44%) had external funding in addition to share capital and 
retained profit.  The most widely used source of external finance was the bank (used by 69% 
of companies). Indeed, 51% of the sample companies give a copy of their statutory accounts 
to the bank and other providers of finance.  In 2002, the bank and other providers of finance 
had requested audited accounts in 27% of companies, whilst the shareholders had requested 
the accounts to be audited in 30% of companies. 
 
A maximum turnover of £1m was used as a proxy for eligibility for audit exemption in the 
2002 accounts. Of the 633 companies in this category, 58% had filed exempt accounts whilst 
42% had filed audited accounts.  The main reason given for not having the accounts audited 
was lower accountancy fees, but very few directors were able to provide details of the 
specific amount saved.  If they became eligible for exemption, 56% of companies intended to 
take up exemption and 42% would not (2% did not respond).
7
  There are some reservations 
on basing an analysis on predicted behaviour, but in this case it can be justified, as the 
directors’ forecasts are almost identical to their decisions in the 2002 accounts. 
 
3.4 Variables in the analysis 
 
Table 2 summarises the variables in the analysis. Data relating to turnover and audit fees 
were obtained from the companies’ 2002 accounts.  All other data was collected via the 
questionnaire survey in 2003 (non-responses were excluded from the analysis). 
 
                                               
7 The vast majority of companies (79%) that were likely to be eligible for the first time predicted they would 
have a voluntary audit. 
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Table 2 
Description of variables 
 
Label Description 
VOLAUDIT Whether the company would have a voluntary audit (1, 0) 
TOVER Size of company as measured by turnover (£m) 
FEE Audit fee in 2002 accounts (£k) 
CHECK Extent of agreement that the audit provides a check on accounting 
records and systems (1 = disagree, 5 = agree) 
QUALITY Extent of agreement that audit improves the quality of the financial 
information (1 = disagree, 5 = agree) 
CREDITSC Extent of agreement that audit has a positive effect on the company’s 
credit rating score (1 = disagree, 5 = agree) 
FAMILY Whether the company is wholly family-owned (1, 0) 
EXOWNERS Whether the company has shareholders without access to internal 
financial information (1, 0) 
BANK Whether the statutory accounts are given to the bank and other 
providers of finance (1, 0) 
 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics where appropriate.
8
 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Label Data N Min Max Mean SD 
VOLAUDIT Nominal 772 0 1 N/A N/A 
TOVER Ratio 790 .000054 4.738271 .69107062 1.119448910 
FEE Ratio 424 .114 19.000 3.04445 2.658052 
CHECK Ordinal 697 1 5 4.05 1.191 
QUALITY Ordinal 687 1 5 3.35 1.379 
CREDITSC Ordinal 681 1 5 3.55 1.287 
FAMILY Nominal 785 0 1 N/A N/A 
EXOWNERS Nominal 722 0 1 N/A N/A 
BANK Nominal 790 0 1 N/A N/A 
 
 VOLAUDIT (question 14 in the questionnaire) is the dependent variable.  It consists of 
two groups: companies that would have a voluntary audit (coded 1) and companies that 
would not have the accounts audited if exempt (coded 0). 
 TOVER measures turnover (in £m). The natural log (TOVERLOG) is used in the 
regression to account for non-linearity in the data. 
 FEE measures the audit fee in £k, as disclosed in the 2002 statutory accounts. The natural 
log (FEELOG) is used in the regression to account for non-linearity in the data. 
 CHECK, QUALITY and CREDITSC represent management factors and capture whether 
the directors perceive the audit as providing a check on accounting records and systems, 
improving the quality of the financial information or having a positive effect on the 
                                               
8 Strictly speaking, the mean cannot be calculated for ordinal data, since the numeric scale represents ranked 
nominal categories.  It is given here as an indication of central tendency.  The multivariate statistics were based 
on ranked data. 
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company’s credit rating score (questions 15a, 15c and 15h respectively).  They are coded 
on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is disagree and 5 is agree with the statement. 
 FAMILY is an agency factor and captures family ownership (question 1).  It is a dummy 
variable that is coded 1 if the company is wholly family-owned and 0 otherwise. Previous 
research (Collis, 2003b; Collis et al., 2004) shows it is negatively associated with the 
demand for voluntary audit. 
 EXOWNERS is an agency factor that captures external ownership (question 3).  It is a 
dummy variable that is coded 1 if there are shareholders without access to internal 
financial information and 0 otherwise. 
 BANK is an agency factor and captures whether the statutory accounts are given to the 
bank and other providers of finance (question 18).  It is a dummy variable that is coded 1 
if the company gives the statutory accounts to the bank and lenders and 0 otherwise. 
   
3.5 Multicollinearity 
 
The data was examined for collinearity by examining a correlation matrix of the ordinal and 
ratio variables.
9
  Although none of the correlation coefficients shown in Table 4 indicate very 
high correlation (≥ 0.9), the results that have been highlighted give some cause for concern, 
since high levels of correlation make it hard to identify the predictive power of individual 
variables and increase the probability that a good predictor of an outcome will be found non-
significant (Kervin, 1992). 
 
Table 4 
Correlation matrix of ratio and ordinal independent variables 
 
  TOVER FEE CHECK QUALITY CREDITSC 
TOVER 1.000     
FEE 0.571** 1.000    
CHECK 0.100** 0.102* 1.000   
QUALITY 0.105** 0.022 0.626** 1.000  
CREDITSC 0.192** 0.130* 0.504** 0.532** 1.000 
 
Notes: N = 790 (cases excluded pairwise)  
 See Table 2 for a description of the variables 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
*   Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
4.1 Principal components of benefits 
 
Factor analysis was used to identify the principal components among the specific benefits of 
voluntary audit identified by Collis (2003).  Table 5 shows the rotated component matrix, 
where the varimax rotation converged in three iterations. 
 
                                               
9 FAMILY, EXOWNERS and BANK are not suitable for this procedure as they are measured on a nominal 
scale. 
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Table 5 Factor analysis of qualitative predictors of voluntary audit 
 
Variable Component 1 
Management benefits 
(34% of variance) 
Component 2 
Agency benefits 
(21% of variance) 
CHECK   .831   .021 
QUALITY   .858   .022 
CREDITSC   .785   .043 
FAMILY   .039 -.733 
EXOWNERS -.032   .653 
BANK   .137   .560 
 
The high factor scores for the directors’ beliefs about the value of the audit as a check on 
accounting records and systems, improving the quality of the financial information and 
having a positive effect on the company’s credit rating score form Component 1. This has 
been intuitively labelled as ‘management benefits’ of the audit. Component 2 groups together 
the existence on non-family shareholders, external shareholders and giving the accounts to 
the bank and other providers of finance. This has been intuitively labelled as ‘agency 
benefits’ of the audit. This examination aids the interpretation of the multiple regression 
models in the next section of the paper. 
 
4.2 Costs and benefits 
 
Table 6 examines a logistic regression analysis of the demand for voluntary audit 
(VOLAUDIT) against cost and the specific benefit factors.  Previous research (Collis, 2003b; 
Collis et al, 2004) highlights the importance of size as one of the determinants of whether a 
company will have a voluntary audit. This suggests that turnover might be proxying for cost 
in the cost-benefit analysis. To test this hypothesis, Model 1 shows the results where audit fee 
(FEELOG) represents cost in the analysis and Model 2 shows the results where turnover 
(TOVERLOG) is substituted as a proxy for cost. In both cases, the specific management and 
agency benefits identified by Collis (2003b) are also included in the models. 
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Table 6 
Logistic regression of demand for voluntary audit: Models 1 & 2 
 
Variable B SE Wald p Exp(B) 
Model 1      
FEELOG .463 .158 8.576 .003 1.589 
CHECK .247 .154 2.585 .108 1.280 
QUALITY .462 .132 12.199 .000 1.588 
CREDITSC .419 .124 11.456 .001 1.521 
FAMILY -.925 .294 9.921 .002 .397 
EXOWNERS .410 .359 1.305 .253 1.507 
BANK .296 .314 .888 .346 1.344 
Constant  -3.583 .656 29.852 .000 .028 
Model 2      
TOVERLOG .342 .066 26.967 .000 1.408 
CHECK .298 .117 6.495 .011 1.347 
QUALITY .425 .095 19.810 .000 1.530 
CREDITSC .285 .093 9.345 .002 1.329 
FAMILY -.706 .212 11.102 .001 .494 
EXOWNERS .733 .266 7.605 .006 2.082 
BANK .295 .230 1.653 .198 1.343 
Constant  -3.087 .525 34.591 .000 .046 
 
Model summaries: 
    Model 1: N = 334, Chi-square 110.094, df 7, p < .01, -2 Log likelihood 329.467, Nagelkerke R2 .384 
    Model 2: N= 602, Chi-square 208.082, df 7, p < .01, -2 Log likelihood 624.766, Nagelkerke R2 .390 
 
The results show that both turnover and cost are significant factors, in addition to a range of 
specific benefits. To examine whether size is proxying for cost, the final analysis enters 
FEELOG and TOVERLOG simultaneously in the model with the specific management and 
agency benefits. The results are shown in Table 7.  
 
Table 7 Logistic regression of demand for voluntary audit: Model 3 
 
Variable B SE Wald p Exp(B) 
TOVERLOG .154 .117 1.728 .189 1.166 
FEELOG .288 .205 1.969 .161 1.334 
CHECK .256 .154 2.745 .098 1.291 
QUALITY .469 .132 12.599 .000 1.599 
CREDITSC .400 .125 10.227 .001 1.491 
FAMILY -.932 .295 9.966 .002 .394 
EXOWNERS .391 .360 1.183 .277 1.479 
BANK .121 .340 .127 .721 1.129 
Constant -3.161 .725 19.015 .000 .042 
 
Model summary: N = 334, Chi-square 111.836, df 8, p < 0.01, -2 Log likelihood 327.725, Nagelkerke R2 0.389 
 
Looking first at the results for the two size variables, it can be seen that neither are 
significant. This is likely to be due to correlation between these two variables, which is 
demonstrated in Table 4. Therefore, they are both measuring the same effect (ie cost). The 
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results for the factors representing the benefits of the audit are significant in respect of the 
two management benefits (QUALITY and CREDITSC) and one agency benefit (FAMILY). 
In addition, it can be seen that the factor coefficient (B) for FAMILY has the expected 
negative sign.  The reason why CHECK is not significant is likely to be due to relatively high 
levels of correlation with QUALITY that were demonstrated in Table 4. Examining the 
goodness of fit of the three models, it can be seen that the R
2
 explains approximately 39% of 
the demand for the audit.   
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Harmonisation with EU size thresholds means that the enlarged category of small companies 
in the UK contains two subgroups with differing needs.  This is demonstrated by the 
significant proportion of directors whose audit decisions indicate that the benefits outweigh 
the costs.  This study provides evidence on the adequacy of different size measures as 
surrogates for the costs versus benefits of voluntary audit in small companies filing full 
accounts. 
 
A general interpretation of the results is that directors who are willing to bear the cost of the 
audit do so because of their beliefs about the specific benefits to the company and the role the 
audited accounts play in supporting agency relationships where there is information 
asymmetry. The analysis in this paper demonstrates that size, as measured by turnover, is a 
significant factor in predicting whether the directors consider the cost of having a voluntary 
audit will outweigh the management and agency benefits. It goes further than previous 
research by providing empirical evidence to support the proposition that it is a sufficient 
proxy for cost in the demand for voluntary audit in small companies of the size studied. 
 
The raising of the turnover threshold for audit exemption by successive governments in the 
UK since 1994, suggests that these decisions have not been underpinned by any theory of 
size. This paper offers such a theory and should be of interest to all those involved in the 
development of little GAAP at national and international levels. 
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Appendix 
Extract of questionnaire showing variables analysed 
 
 
1. Is the company a family-owned business? (Tick one box only) 
Wholly family-owned  (1) 
Partly family-owned  (2) 
None of the shareholders are related  (0) 
 
3. How many shareholders (owners) does the company have? 
(a) Total number of shareholders   
     Breakdown:   
(b) Number of shareholders with access to internal financial information   
(c) Number of shareholders without access to internal financial information   
 
11. If the statutory accounts were not audited last year but were audited previously, have overall 
accountancy costs decreased? 
No  (0) 
Yes, by approximately                                                                                                     £         
 
13. Do you think the turnover threshold for exemption from the statutory audit should be increased from 
£1m to £4.8m? 
(Tick one box only) 
Yes, increase to £4.8m  (1) 
No, stay at £1m  (0) 
Other                                                                                                                             £m         
 
14. Would you have the accounts audited even if the company were not legally required to do so? 
(Tick one box only) 
Yes, the accounts are already audited voluntarily  (1) 
Yes, the accounts would be audited voluntarily  (2) 
No  (0) 
 
Please give reasons for either answer 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………….……………………………………………………………………………………………... 
 
15. What are your views on the following statements regarding the audit? 
(Circle the number closest to your view) 
 Agree                                           Disagree 
(a) Provides a check on accounting records and systems 5 4 3 2 1 
(b) Helps protect against fraud 5 4 3 2 1 
(c) Improves the quality of the financial information 5 4 3 2 1 
(d) Improves the credibility of the financial information 5 4 3 2 1 
(e) Provides assurance to shareholders 5 4 3 2 1 
(f) Provides assurance to the bank and other lenders 5 4 3 2 1 
(g) Provides assurance to suppliers and trade creditors 5 4 3 2 1 
(h) Has a positive effect on company’s credit rating score 5 4 3 2 1 
Other (please state) 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………….……………………………………………………………………………………………... 
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18. Apart from Companies House, who normally receives a copy of the company’s statutory accounts? 
(Tick as many boxes as apply) 
(a) Shareholders   
(b) Bank and other providers of finance   
(c) Directors/managers who are not shareholders   
(d) Employees who are not shareholders   
(e) Major suppliers and trade creditors   
(f) Major customers   
(g) Inland Revenue   
Other (please state)   
 
............................................................................................................................. .............. 
  
 
19. If the accounts were audited last year, is it because any of the following users requested it? 
(Tick as many boxes as apply) 
(a) Shareholders   
(b) Bank and other providers of finance   
(c) Major suppliers and trade creditors   
(d) Major customers   
(e) Inland Revenue   
Other (please state)   
 
........................................................................................................................................... 
  
 
20. Apart from capital invested by the shareholders and retained profit, is the company currently 
financed by any of the following? 
(Tick as many boxes as apply) 
(a) Personal loans from family or friends.   
(b) Bank finance   
(c) Business angel capital   
(d) Venture capital   
(e) Leasing   
(f) Hire purchase   
(g) Factoring   
Other (please state)   
 
........................................................................................................................................... 
  
 
22. What is your position in the company? 
(Tick one box only) 
The sole director  (1) 
The principal director (eg managing director or chief executive)  (2) 
The finance director   (3) 
Other (please state)   
 
............................................................................................................................. .............. 
  
 
23. Do you have any of the following qualifications/training? 
(Tick as many boxes as apply) 
(a) Undergraduate or postgraduate degree   
(b) Professional/vocational qualification   
(c) Study/training in business or management subjects   
 
 
 
